Longtermism

This is a primer on the word “longtermism”: where it came from, what the argument behind it claims, who paid for it, and what became of it once the money and the mandates moved on to other names.

tl;dr: “Longtermism” is a young word. William MacAskill of the effective altruism movement proposed it in Oxford in October 2017, for ideas Derek Parfit sketched in 1984 and Nick Bostrom worked out by 2003 without a name: if the future can hold astronomically many people, reducing the risk of human extinction outweighs everything else anyone could do today. MacAskill’s book argues a mild version. The paper he wrote with Hilary Greaves argues the strong one; its first draft called the effects of the next hundred years “little more than tie-breakers,” which the revision dropped. Between 2015 and 2024 the word acquired institutes, a crypto fortune, a paragraph in a UN report and people in the offices where AI policy was written in Washington. An earlier version of this note named Peter Thiel and Elon Musk as its backers; on the record, Thiel’s money went to the Rationalist institute MIRI and Musk’s endorsement is one tweet, “a close match for my philosophy.” Since 2023 the word has been leaving letterheads as programs continue under names like “global catastrophic risks” and “long-term thinking.” Long-term thinking means looking past one’s own horizon and generation. Longtermism is an extreme version of that: it ranks the hypothetical welfare of future generations above the welfare of the people alive now and works as a conversation-stopper against climate action.

Table of contents

A word with a short career

The argument arrived long before its name. In 1984, in Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit asked his readers to compare three outcomes:

“I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater.”1

The last one percent carries every generation that would otherwise follow. Parfit used neither “longtermism” nor “existential risk.” Nick Bostrom, whose paper “Existential Risks” appeared in 2002, gave the argument its full structure a year later in a short paper called “Astronomical Waste”: a sufficiently advanced civilization could sustain an enormous population across the reachable universe, every year of delay costs a corresponding number of possible lives, and so, in his closing words, “for standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and four should consequently be to reduce existential risk.”2 Ten years later he restated the case in “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Neither paper contains the word “longtermism.”3

The word came out of Oxford in October 2017, and it came out of the effective altruism movement. By then that movement had adopted Nick Beckstead’s 2013 dissertation on shaping the far future as the intellectual foundation for the position that was about to get a name; how a movement that started with malaria nets arrived there is told in Effective Altruism.4 MacAskill described the moment himself in a post on the Effective Altruism Forum in July 2019: “In October 2017, I proposed the term ‘longtermism’, with the following definition: Longtermism =df the view that the most important determinant of the value of our actions today is how those actions affect the very long-run future.” The cluster of positions had no name before that, he wrote, and “for these reasons, and with Toby Ord’s in-progress book on existential risk providing urgency, Toby and Joe Carlsmith started leading discussions about whether there were better terms to use.” Ord argued in those discussions for using the word without a definition, the way one uses environmentalism or feminism, for someone “especially concerned with improving the long-term future.”5

Wikipedia, The Nation and other secondary accounts credit the coinage to MacAskill and Ord jointly. MacAskill’s own account is in the first person singular.5 The word was picked in a discussion about what to call the subject of a forthcoming book.

The argument in full

Four moves make the case, and each of them has a canonical sentence.

The first move is that distance in time takes nothing away from moral weight. Toby Ord states it in The Precipice (2020) by analogy with distance in space. Recognizing that people matter equally regardless of where they live was a form of moral progress, he writes, and “People matter equally regardless of their temporal location too. Our lives matter just as much as those lived thousands of years ago, or those a thousand years hence.” A footnote adds: “By ‘matter just as much’ I mean that each good or bad thing in their life matters equally regardless of when they live.”6

The second move is scale. Bostrom’s 2013 paper starts on Earth: “If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 1016 human lives of normal duration.” Then it leaves the planet: “One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years. Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years.”3 MacAskill’s popular version in What We Owe the Future (2022) takes a million years at today’s population: “there would be eighty trillion people yet to come; future people would outnumber us ten thousand to one.”7

The third move multiplies. Bostrom writes in the same 2013 paper: “Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilisation a mere 1 per cent chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.”3 Once a number that large sits on one side of the calculation, no present-day intervention can compete on the other side.

The fourth move turns the calculation into a rule. Bostrom calls it Maxipok: “When pursuing the impartial good, one should seek to maximize the probability of an ‘OK outcome,’ where an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids existential catastrophe.”8

The largest of the numbers depends on one further assumption, that minds running on computers count. Carl Shulman and Bostrom spell it out in “Sharing the World with Digital Minds” (2021): “If two beings have the same functionality and the same conscious experience, and differ only in the substrate of their implementation, then they have the same moral status.”9 The 1054 figure counts emulated life-years. The gap between the biological estimate and the digital one is twenty orders of magnitude.

Weak, strong, and the line between them

MacAskill draws the line himself, in the terminology chapter of What We Owe the Future: “This book defends and explores the implications of longtermism, the view that positively influencing the longterm future is one of the key moral priorities of our time. It should be distinguished from strong longtermism, the view that positively influencing the longterm future is the moral priority of our time.”7 The book’s case rests on three premises: “(1) Future people count. (2) There could be lots of them. (3) We can make their lives go better.” He adds: “these premises are simple, and I don’t think they are particularly controversial. Yet taking them seriously amounts to a moral revolution.”7

The strong version lives in an academic paper. In “The Case for Strong Longtermism,” a Global Priorities Institute working paper first issued in 2019 and revised in 2021, Hilary Greaves and MacAskill write: “In this article we go further, arguing for strong longtermism: the view that impact on the far future is the most important feature of our actions today.” The first version drew the practical conclusion on its opening page, in the sentence critics quote most: “for the purposes of evaluating actions, we can in the first instance often simply ignore all the effects contained in the first 100 (or even 1000) years, focussing primarily on the further-future effects. Short-run effects act as little more than tie-breakers.” The June 2021 revision leaves that passage out. Asked why, MacAskill told Sigal Samuel of Vox that the authors feared it was “misleading” to the public; the thesis it summarized stayed in the paper.10 The 2021 revision also added sections on two objections the authors take seriously, “fanaticism” and “cluelessness,” and illustrates the first with a choice between “a ‘safe option’ of saving a thousand lives for sure and a ‘risky option’ that gives a one in a trillion chance of saving a quintillion lives.”10

In the same interview, published in September 2022, MacAskill said he was “sympathetic” to strong longtermism and, in Samuel’s words, thinks it is probably right, while the book argues mostly for the weak version. A third stop further down the same line, which Samuel labeled galaxy-brain longtermism, he called “mistaken.”11

The public face of longtermism is the mild version, and its main author said in a 2022 interview that the strong one is probably right.

Money and mandates, 2015 to 2024

The institutions were there before the word, and the word had them before it had a public. Bostrom founded the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford in 2005. Elon Musk gave it money in 2015, the same year he funded the Future of Life Institute.12 The steady money came from Open Philanthropy, the grantmaker funded by Dustin Moskovitz and Cari Tuna. It funded FHI and seeded the Global Priorities Institute that Greaves and MacAskill founded at Oxford in 2018,13 and its grants for longtermist causes rose from $2 million in 2015 to more than $100 million in 2021; by September 2022 it had put more than $480 million into them since 2015.14

The mandate trail started in New York before the crypto money arrived. In September 2021, UN Secretary-General António Guterres published “Our Common Agenda.” The report uses “long-termism” exactly once, in paragraph 56, where a planned “Futures Laboratory” “could support States, subnational authorities and others to build capacity and exchange good practices to enhance long-termism, forward action and adaptability.” Two paragraphs later Guterres proposes “the appointment of a Special Envoy for Future Generations, building on a proposal by my predecessor in 2013,” who “could be tasked with representing the interests of those who are expected to be born over the coming century,” and after that a “Declaration on Future Generations.”15 The envoy idea had been on the table at the UN four years before MacAskill proposed the word.

Anja Kaspersen and Wendell Wallach of the Carnegie Council read the vocabulary and drew the line a year later: “The well-intentioned philosophy of long-termism, then, risks becoming a Trojan horse for the vested interests of a select few. Therefore we were surprised to see this philosophical position run like a red thread through ‘Our Common Agenda,’ the new and far-reaching manifesto of United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.”16 Their charge concerns the uptake of a vocabulary and its logic. No source consulted for this note shows MacAskill or anyone from the longtermist institutes advising the UN process. In the one appearance on the subject found for this note, an interview with UN Dispatch in August 2022, MacAskill speaks as an outside commentator who welcomes the proposals: “the U.N. is now taking the interests of future generations very seriously and taking actions in that direction, too.”17

Then came the crypto money. The FTX Future Fund, set up in 2022 by Sam Bankman-Fried, reported $160 million “awarded” by 1 September 2022; an archived version of its website, cited by Reuters, listed $132 million across 262 grants and investments as of June 2022. FTX collapsed on 11 November 2022. No public accounting exists of how much of the awarded money was paid out, clawed back or canceled; Reuters reported only that the bankruptcy estate asked recipients for voluntary repayment.18 The fund’s place in the wider movement is told in Effective Altruism.

Washington followed in 2023. In October, President Biden signed Executive Order 14110 on artificial intelligence. Politico reported in December that the RAND Corporation had received more than $15 million in discretionary grants from Open Philanthropy that year for work on AI and biosecurity, that RAND’s CEO Jason Matheny and its senior scientist Jeff Alstott were “well-known effective altruists,” and that RAND staff had helped write the order’s reporting requirements. RAND’s spokesman answered: “The people and organizations who fund RAND research have no influence on the results of our work, including our policy recommendations.”19 An earlier Politico piece had reported that an organization “backed by Silicon Valley billionaires” was “funding the salaries of more than a dozen AI fellows in key congressional offices, across federal agencies and at influential think tanks”: the Horizon Institute for Public Service, set up with Open Philanthropy money in 2022.20 Alongside the order, a US AI Safety Institute was set up at the National Institute of Standards and Technology; in 2024 it named Paul Christiano, formerly of OpenAI’s alignment team and a figure in the community described in Effective Altruism, its head of AI safety.21 On 1 and 2 November 2023 the British government convened the AI Safety Summit at Bletchley Park. Twenty-eight countries, among them the United States and China, and the European Union signed the Bletchley Declaration, and the government announced the world’s first state AI Safety Institute. No source consulted for this note connects the summit to longtermist money or personnel. Bletchley is here because the institute announced there is one of the two that change their names in 2025, in the section on the word’s retreat.22

The UN trail ended in September 2024 with the Summit of the Future and its Pact for the Future. A full-text search of the pact and its annexes finds neither “long-termism” nor “longtermism.” The phrase throughout is “long-term thinking”: member states commit to “embed the needs and interests of future generations and long-term thinking in policymaking processes by fostering cooperation and facilitating greater use of anticipatory planning and foresight, based on science, data and statistics.” The Declaration on Future Generations was adopted by consensus on 22 September 2024 as an annex. The Special Envoy survived as a sentence. The declaration says the member states “Take note of the Secretary-General’s proposal to appoint a Special Envoy for Future Generations to support the implementation of this Declaration.” No appointment had been reported by September 2026.23

Year Money trail Mandate trail
2015 Musk: $10 million to the Future of Life Institute, £1 million to FHI  
2018 GPI founded with more than £2 million from Open Philanthropy; £13.3 million from Open Philanthropy to FHI  
2021 Open Philanthropy’s longtermist grants pass $100 million a year “Our Common Agenda”: “long-termism” in paragraph 56, Special Envoy and Declaration proposed
2022 FTX Future Fund: $160 million awarded by September, collapse in November  
2023 Open Philanthropy: more than $15 million to RAND Executive Order 14110 (October); Bletchley Declaration and first AI Safety Institute (November)
2024   Pact for the Future: “long-term thinking”; Declaration adopted; Special Envoy “taken note of”

The earlier version of this note put two names at the center of the money trail: longtermism, it said, was “backed by the likes of Thiel and Musk.”24 The record is narrower. Musk’s role, beyond the two gifts of 2015, is a reply on Twitter. On 2 August 2022 he answered MacAskill’s post about What We Owe the Future: “Worth reading. This is a close match for my philosophy.” That is the whole of it: a tweet, with no self-description as a longtermist, later described in Foreign Policy and elsewhere as an endorsement.25 Peter Thiel’s documented giving went to the Singularity Institute, later renamed the Machine Intelligence Research Institute: matching funds from 2006, a cumulative $1.627 million according to the Thiel Foundation’s own figures, and a board seat from around 2007 to 2014. No record turned up of Thiel money for the Global Priorities Institute, the Future of Humanity Institute, the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk or the Forethought Foundation.26 Thiel belongs to the story of the Rationalists, and the political project his money serves is traced in From the Californian Ideology to the Texan Ideology. The longtermist institutes were financed by Open Philanthropy and, in FHI’s case, once by Musk.

The two trails show three different things. In Washington, money and people are documented close to the decision: Open Philanthropy’s grants to RAND, RAND staff on the order’s reporting requirements, Horizon fellows in congressional offices, and a denial from RAND that any of it shaped its recommendations. At the UN, the vocabulary traveled without the movement; the sources checked for this note put nobody from the institutes inside the process that wrote “Our Common Agenda.” At FTX, the money disappeared without an accounting. For the question of whom the philosophy serves, the record therefore holds one place where the money sits next to a decision, one place where it vanished, and a mandate trail the movement is nowhere shown to have touched.

Four ways to push back

The criticism sorts into four lines, three of them aimed at a move of the argument above and one at the people behind it. The sharpest version of the first line comes from inside the movement’s own institute.

The philosophical line goes after the third move, the multiplication. David Thorstad, then at the Global Priorities Institute, examined it in “Mistakes in the Moral Mathematics of Existential Risk” (2024). He identifies three errors in the standard calculation, “focusing on cumulative risk rather than period risk; ignoring background risk; and neglecting population dynamics,” and finds that correcting them pushes the value of risk reduction “substantially below leading estimates, potentially low enough to threaten the normative case for existential risk mitigation.” He sums it up: “the value of existential risk mitigation is inflated by many orders of magnitude.”27 Others on this line take adjacent targets: Christian Tarsney, also at GPI, calls the pattern “Pascalian,” choices settled by “minuscule probabilities of extreme positive or negative outcomes,”28 Kieran Setiya’s review in the Boston Review goes after the first move, the axioms of the population ethics underneath,29 and Peter Singer, whose work started the movement that produced longtermism, wrote in 2021 that viewing current problems “through the lens of existential risk to our species can shrink those problems to almost nothing, while justifying almost anything that increases our odds of surviving long enough to spread beyond Earth.”30 Richard Yetter Chappell defends the arithmetic against both worries, “swamping effects” and “fanatical or extremist behavior,” by proposing “suitable guardrails on how we put theory into practice that limit downside risk without symmetrically capping the upside of rational reflection.”31

The political-economic line leaves the arithmetic alone and asks whom it serves. Alexander Zaitchik wrote in The New Republic: “With its blend of wild-eyed techno-optimism and utopianism, longtermism has emerged as the parlor philosophy of choice among the Silicon Valley jet-pack set. […] what commands attention to longtermism is not any compelling case for prioritizing the value of distant exoplanets and centuries, but the billionaire politics it seeks to impose on the rest of us.”32 Timnit Gebru’s tweet calling longtermism and effective altruism “a religion in Silicon Valley” and Kaspersen and Wallach’s Trojan horse belong to the same line; both are in the reading list below.33

The ideological-historical line reads longtermism as the latest edition of an older program, and its target is the assumption behind the largest number: that the potential to be fulfilled is a future of digital minds. Émile P. Torres, a former longtermist, has written against it since 2021, and the one-sentence version is in the Aeon essay of October 2021: “This is the central dogma of longtermism: nothing matters more, ethically speaking, than fulfilling our potential as a species of ‘Earth-originating intelligent life’.”34 With Gebru, Torres formalized the genealogy in the TESCREAL paper of 2024, the subject of TESCREAL: “many of the very same discriminatory attitudes that animated eugenicists in the past (e.g., racism, xenophobia, classism, ableism, and sexism) remain widespread within the movement to build AGI, resulting in systems that harm marginalized groups and centralize power, while using the language of ‘safety’ and ‘benefiting humanity’ to evade accountability.”35 The line gained a concrete exhibit in January 2023, when a 1996 mailing-list email by Bostrom containing a racist remark became public, and Torres has since described the work of FHI and its offshoots as “eugenics on steroids.”36

The practical line counts what the fourth move, the rule, drops. Christine Emba wrote in the Washington Post that “A not-yet-extant population can’t complain or criticize or interfere, which makes the future a much more pleasant sandbox in which to pursue your interests,”37 and Ellen Huet’s Bloomberg reportage compressed the turn into one line of her own: “So scratch the malaria nets and concentrate on the apocalypses, like nuclear proliferation, future pandemics and, yes, runaway AI.”38 Dave Karpf names the thing dropped. He borrows William Gibson’s Jackpot, a slow, multi-causal die-off of 80 percent of humanity, the subject of The Jackpot: “We should be clear about the value judgments Longtermism is smuggling through. […] Climate catastrophes are (most likely) not an existential risk. These are matters that deeply matter to people who exist today. […] But they do not matter in the longest term.” His closing sentence reads: “The Jackpot is a warning, not a promise. Distrust any philosophical tradition that would suggest otherwise.”39 Karpf’s charge can be checked against the movement’s own numbers.

The climate question

Ord’s risk table is the exhibit critics quote most often. He reproduced it from The Precipice in written evidence to a UK parliamentary committee on 27 January 2021: total existential risk over the next hundred years around 1 in 6, unaligned artificial intelligence around 1 in 10, climate change around 1 in 1,000, the same figure as for nuclear war.40 AI outranks climate by a factor of a hundred. In a 2024 update Ord wrote, “Climate risk is down, Nuclear is up, and the story on Pandemics and AI is mixed,” and left the orders of magnitude where they were.41

The institutions moved in the same direction. In 2021, the career advice site 80,000 Hours listed “Extreme climate change” under “Top areas to work on,” alongside AI, pandemics and nuclear security. In October 2024 it announced: “We now rank climate change in the category of other pressing problems alongside global health, rather than among the most pressing problems in the world,” and explained that “Climate change is significantly less neglected than other problems we focus on.” Its current ranking puts loss of control of advanced AI, AI-enabled concentration of power and engineered pandemics at the top and continues: “After this, we recommend working on great power conflict, factory farming, wild animal suffering, global health, and climate change.”42 MacAskill said in a 2025 interview that “the most extreme cases of environmental and climate destruction would go via AI.”43 Climate sits last on the list, behind wild animal suffering.

A word in retreat

From 2023 on, the word and the institutions around it started to change their names or close. The table lists seven changes of name or status between 2023 and 2025. They are three different things.

Date and institution Change
2023, Open Philanthropy grant portfolio “Longtermism” becomes “Global Catastrophic Risks”
April 2024, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford closed
September 2024, United Nations, Pact for the Future “long-termism” of 2021 becomes “long-term thinking”
February 2025, UK AI Safety Institute becomes AI Security Institute
June 2025, US AI Safety Institute at NIST becomes Center for AI Standards and Innovation
July 2025, Global Priorities Institute, Oxford closed
November 2025, Open Philanthropy, the organization becomes Coefficient Giving

Only two of the seven drop the word itself. Open Philanthropy renamed its “Longtermism” portfolio on the grounds that AI and biological risks threaten the present as well,44 and the UN’s pact replaced the “long-termism” of 2021 with “long-term thinking” without comment.23 These two are the word’s retreat in the strict sense. Two more are closures, and no label was dropped with them. Oxford closed FHI after what the university called a periodic review of its research structures; Bostrom called it “death by bureaucracy,” pointing to a hiring and fundraising freeze imposed by the philosophy faculty in 2020 and to contracts left unrenewed at the end of 2023. GPI closed with no reason given on its site.45 The remaining three are renamings of names that never contained the word. The British government renamed its AI Safety Institute, announced by Technology Secretary Peter Kyle at the Munich Security Conference, so that the name would reflect work on AI-enabled cyberattacks, chemical and biological weapons, fraud and child sexual abuse material; the US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick renamed the American institute with an emphasis on evaluating commercial systems, competitiveness and national security.46 Open Philanthropy became Coefficient Giving and gave five reasons, among them confusion with OpenAI and the Open Society Foundations. “Our mission and values remain the same,” the announcement says.44 In the third group, “safety” went the same way within one year, 2025, at the institutions the money and the mandates had run through. None of the stated reasons, in any of the three groups, mentions the word.

The word itself has kept its authors. MacAskill used it in two 80,000 Hours interviews in 2025, and Ord refers to it in research published that year.47 Whether the renamings add up to a deliberate distancing is undocumented. What the record shows is a word leaving the letterheads while AI risk, biosecurity and existential risk research carry on under other names.

What long-term thinking is, and what longtermism made of it

Long-term thinking, as I understand it, means deliberately thinking past one’s own horizon and one’s own generation, and weighing the future consequences of what we do today. Longtermism is an extreme version of that. It ranks the hypothetical welfare of future generations above the welfare of the people alive now. And it works as a conversation-stopper against climate action; the record above shows the mechanism. Ord’s table puts unaligned AI a hundred times ahead of climate change. 80,000 Hours moved climate change out of its top problems in 2024 and now lists it last, behind wild animal suffering. MacAskill routes the climate question through AI: “the most extreme cases of environmental and climate destruction would go via AI.”43 That sentence is the conversation-stopper at work. Current action against climate change gets waved away because future generations, so the argument goes, will face the far bigger challenge from superintelligent AI.

MacAskill’s own distinction does most of the work here. Weak longtermism, in his formulation, rests on the three premises quoted above. Governments and institutions worked from those premises before the word existed: the UN proposal for a Special Envoy for Future Generations dates from 2013, and the Welsh Well-being of Future Generations Act received Royal Assent in April 2015, two and a half years before the coinage.48 Everything that makes longtermism a movement of its own comes from the strong version: the tie-breaker sentence, the 1054, Maxipok, the risk table. Open Philanthropy’s reason for renaming its portfolio in 2023, that AI and biological risks threaten the present as well, quietly hands the ground back to the weak version. Weak longtermism is ordinary long-term thinking with a new label. MacAskill's original definition of October 2017, “the most important determinant of the value of our actions today,” already reads like the strong version.

The other tradition of long-term thinking has its own canon: Jonas Salk’s question “Are we being good ancestors?”, Stewart Brand and Brian Eno’s Long Now, cathedral thinking, the Seventh Generation Principle, the Welsh act of 2015 and its Future Generations Commissioner. Roman Krznaric’s The Good Ancestor draws on this canon, and he is the clearest voice against longtermism from that side. In a 2024 podcast episode on philosophy and future generations he said of the movement behind the word: “I think that effective altruism is quite ineffective. It’s got these biases built in like all political ideologies do,” and of its central preoccupation: “The whole discussion about AI apocalypse is a kind of a ghost story that functions to distract us from the very real impacts of everyday AI today.”49 His underlying charge is aimed at a wider target than the movement. In 2019 he put it this way: “We treat the future like a distant colonial outpost devoid of people, where we can freely dump ecological degradation, technological risk, nuclear waste and public debt.”50 His horizon runs to decades and to a century, and his reference points are indigenous and democratic.

The professional field of foresight has been quiet. Searches for a stated position on longtermism by the Association of Professional Futurists and the World Futures Studies Federation turned up nothing. The School of International Futures, which wrote an implementation handbook for the UN Declaration on Future Generations, speaks of intergenerational fairness and the wellbeing of future generations.48 The silence is a finding of its own. The field built its own vocabulary for future generations, used it in that handbook, and left the word to the people who had coined it.

So the word retreats, the programs continue, and the humanistic tradition keeps working in parallel with a vocabulary the UN adopted in 2024. The next body that claims to speak for future generations already has a date: the General Assembly plans a high-level meeting on future generations for its 83rd session, expected in 2028.23 The question for that meeting is which of the two traditions it draws on, and what it asks of the people already here on behalf of people who do not yet exist.

Effective Altruism follows the movement that produced the word from malaria nets to AI governance, and Rationalists the community whose institute Thiel funded and its pipeline into the AI labs. TESCREAL holds the bundle thesis of Gebru and Torres. Permanent Underclass names the operation the bundle shares with the Network State, sorting human beings by their usefulness to a project. From the Californian Ideology to the Texan Ideology traces the political project behind the money, and The Jackpot holds Gibson’s scenario that Karpf turns against the philosophy.

Émile P. Torres wrote the earliest sustained critique:

Further critiques:

Two pieces that cover the UN side and the philosophical side:

  1. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, pages 453 to 454. Read for this note in a PDF excerpt of the original pages, https://wmit-pages-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/283/2022/06/12151107/singularity.pdf, and checked against two secondary quotations of the same passage (Philosophy Now; Jim Holt’s review of The Precipice in the New York Review of Books). Parfit uses neither “longtermism” nor “existential risk.” ↩

  2. Bostrom, N. (2003). “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development.” Utilitas 15(3), pages 308 to 314, https://nickbostrom.com/papers/astronomical-waste/. Opened for this note. Bostrom’s earlier paper “Existential Risks” (2002) is referenced in the research base by title and year only. The closing sentence is quoted verbatim; the paper’s own figures are 1038 potential lives per century of delayed colonization of the local supercluster, or 1029 per second. ↩

  3. Bostrom, N. (2013). “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy 4(1), pages 15 to 31, https://files.givewell.org/files/shallow/gcr/Bostrom_2013.pdf. Quotations extracted from the PDF for this note; “the potential exist” and “civilisation” are the paper’s own spelling and grammar. Neither the 2003 nor the 2013 paper uses the word “longtermism.” ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  4. The origin in effective altruism follows this vault’s note Effective Altruism, which records Nick Beckstead’s Rutgers dissertation of 2013, “On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future,” as the intellectual foundation of the position and the movement’s shift toward AI safety and existential risk as largely complete by 2019. That note carries the primary references; none of them was reopened for this primer. MacAskill’s post of 2019 (note 5) appeared on the movement’s own forum, and Singer’s 2021 objection (note 30) is a founder’s objection from inside the same tradition. ↩

  5. MacAskill, W. (2019). “Longtermism.” Effective Altruism Forum, 25 July 2019, https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/qZyshHCNkjs3TvSem/longtermism. Opened for this note. The post is the primary account of the coinage; the joint attribution to “MacAskill and Ord” in Wikipedia’s “Longtermism” article and in The Nation simplifies it. The Global Priorities Institute did not exist in October 2017; it was founded in 2018. ↩ ↩2

  6. Ord, T. (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, page 45 and note 24. The passage was extracted through Perplexity from an archive.org copy of the book (full URL not recorded in the research base), and the page number was confirmed by two independent reviews that quote the same sentence from the same page; the book itself was not opened for this note. An earlier stage of the research recorded page 44 from a review in Population and Development Review; this note follows the page confirmed twice. ↩

  7. MacAskill, W. (2022). What We Owe the Future. Quoted from the PDF at https://utilitarianism.com/macaskill-whatweowethefuture.pdf, opened for this note, and checked against a second copy of the terminology chapter. The terminology sentence continues after a dash in the original: “more important, right now, than anything else.” The eighty-trillion figure assumes a million years at today’s population. The book’s treatment of digital people was not located in the checked excerpt, which is why this note takes that step from Shulman and Bostrom. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  8. Bostrom (2013), as in note 3. The Maxipok formulation is cited here through Forethought, “Beyond Existential Risk,” https://forethought.org/research/beyond-existential-risk, which quotes it verbatim, and through a second secondary source, since the sentence was not extracted from the 2013 PDF directly. ↩

  9. Shulman, C. and Bostrom, N. (2021). “Sharing the World with Digital Minds.” In Clarke, Zohny and Savulescu (eds.), Rethinking Moral Status. Oxford University Press, pages 306 to 326, https://nickbostrom.com/papers/digital-minds.pdf. The sentence was extracted from the PDF through Perplexity; a direct fetch of the file failed on its compression, so it is cited here through that extraction, since the primary text was not opened directly. It is the authors’ “Principle of Substrate Non-Discrimination.” ↩

  10. Greaves, H. and MacAskill, W. (2021). “The Case for Strong Longtermism.” GPI Working Paper No. 5-2021, June 2021, https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Case-for-Strong-Longtermism-GPI-Working-Paper-June-2021-2-2.pdf. Opened for this note. The tie-breakers passage is on page 1 of the first version, GPI Working Paper No. 7-2019, September 2019, read in an Internet Archive copy, http://web.archive.org/web/20191224082807/https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/Greaves_MacAskill_The_Case_for_Strong_Longtermism.pdf; the 2021 text does not contain it. MacAskill’s explanation is reported by Samuel (note 11): “When I asked MacAskill why, he said they feared it was ‘misleading’ to the public.” “Focussing” is the paper’s spelling. The paper also states the thesis formally as axiological and deontic strong longtermism, two clauses each. ↩ ↩2

  11. Samuel, S. (2022). “Effective altruism’s most controversial idea.” Vox, 6 September 2022, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/23298870/effective-altruism-longtermism-will-macaskill-future. MacAskill’s “sympathetic” is quoted as Samuel reports it; “thinks it’s probably right” is her paraphrase, and the three-stop image (weak, strong, galaxy-brain) is hers. Cited here through her article, since no other record of the interview was checked. ↩

  12. Robins-Early, N. (2024). “Oxford shuts down institute run by Elon Musk-backed philosopher.” The Guardian, 19 April 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/apr/19/oxford-future-of-humanity-institute-closes. Opened for this note. The article gives the 2005 founding, Musk’s £1 million in 2015 and Open Philanthropy’s £13.3 million in 2018; both sums are in the table. Musk’s $10 million to the Future of Life Institute, announced in January 2015, is cited here through a Perplexity summary of FLI’s own announcement and FLI’s 2015 review, https://futureoflife.org/newsletter/2015-a-year-in-review/, whose text was not checked. Open Philanthropy’s funders follow Effective Altruism. ↩

  13. University of Oxford press release of 5 April 2018 on the founding of the Global Priorities Institute: seed funding of more than £2 million from Open Philanthropy plus commitments of more than £1 million from Luke Ding and £1 million from Shamil Chandaria. Cited here through a Perplexity summary of the release, https://www.campaign.ox.ac.uk/news/new-global-priorities-institute-opens, whose text was not checked. GPI’s own site, https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org, opened for this note, confirms the 2018 founding. ↩

  14. Huet, E. (2023). “Effective Altruism’s Problems Go Beyond Sam Bankman-Fried.” Bloomberg Businessweek, 7 March 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-03-07/effective-altruism-s-problems-go-beyond-sam-bankman-fried, for the rise from $2 million in 2015 to more than $100 million in 2021; read from a saved copy, since the live page is paywalled. The figure of more than $480 million since 2015 is Emba’s (note 37), as of September 2022. ↩

  15. United Nations (2021). Our Common Agenda. Report of the Secretary-General, September 2021, Section 3, paragraphs 56, 58 and 59, https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Our_Common_Agenda_English_Section_3.pdf. Opened for this note; a full-text search of the Section 3 PDF finds “long-termism” exactly once. The envoy sentence in paragraph 58 is quoted verbatim, including the reference to the previous Secretary-General’s proposal of 2013; that earlier proposal was not looked up for this note. ↩

  16. Kaspersen, A. and Wallach, W. (2022). “Long-termism: An Ethical Trojan Horse.” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 29 September 2022, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/article/long-termism-ethical-trojan-horse. Opened for this note. The authors also write: “The push to popularize long-termism is not an attempt to solve these long-standing intellectual debates, but to make an end run around it.” ↩

  17. MacAskill in conversation with Mark Goldberg, UN Dispatch podcast, first published 15 August 2022, https://undispatch.com/how-longtermism-is-shaping-foreign-policy-will-macaskill/. Opened for this note. Nothing in the interview indicates an advisory or drafting role in “Our Common Agenda.” ↩

  18. Fortune, 14 November 2022, https://fortune.com/2022/11/14/bankman-fried-ftx-collapse-threatens-effective-altruism-billions-charity-philanthropy/, for $160 million awarded as of 1 September 2022; Reuters, 6 April 2023, for the archived $132 million across 262 grants and investments as of June 2022 and for the repayment requests. Both cited here through Perplexity summaries, since the texts were not checked; the Reuters URL was not recorded. The collapse date follows Effective Altruism. ↩

  19. Bordelon, B. (2023). “Think tank tied to tech billionaires played key role in Biden’s AI order.” Politico, 15 December 2023. The article sits behind Politico’s bot protection and was read in excerpts only, cited here through those excerpts and through VentureBeat of 19 December 2023, since the full primary text was not checked; the article is at https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/15/billionaire-backed-think-tank-played-key-role-in-bidens-ai-order-00132128 and refuses automated readers. Executive Order 14110 was signed in October 2023 and revoked in January 2025 (see Rationalists). ↩

  20. Bordelon, B. (2023). “How a billionaire-backed network of AI advisers took over Washington.” Politico, 13 October 2023. Only the opening paragraph could be verified verbatim; the Horizon Institute’s founding year, the roughly $3 million for the first cohort and the placements (Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, State Department, House Science Committee, Senate Commerce Committee, RAND, Georgetown’s CSET) are cited here through secondary summaries and a Senate Commerce Committee letter of 1 July 2024, since the primary text was not checked. Public URL not recorded. ↩

  21. The US AI Safety Institute at NIST: NIST’s own account says the institute “was established following the Biden-Harris administration’s 2023 Executive Order,” https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/us-ai-safety-institute-signs-agreements-regarding-ai-safety-research, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo named Paul Christiano head of AI safety on 16 April 2024, https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/04/us-commerce-secretary-gina-raimondo-announces-expansion-us-ai-safety; both pages opened for this note through search extracts. Christiano’s place in the community is recorded in this vault’s note Effective Altruism. Christiano’s path from OpenAI’s alignment team through the Alignment Research Center is recorded in the same note. Claims about effective altruist links inside the British taskforce rest on a single advocacy dossier and are left out (note 22). ↩

  22. UK Government, “The Bletchley Declaration,” 1 November 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration, and the Chair’s Summary of 2 November 2023 on gov.uk. Opened for this note. The institute grew out of the Frontier AI Taskforce set up in June 2023. Claims about effective altruist links inside the taskforce rest on a single advocacy dossier and are left out of this note. ↩

  23. United Nations (2024). The Pact for the Future, with Annex I (Global Digital Compact) and Annex II (Declaration on Future Generations), https://www.un.org/pact-for-the-future and the PDF on un.org/pga. Opened and searched in full for this note. Adoption by consensus on 22 September 2024 per UN press release GA/12627, cited here through a Perplexity summary, since the release was not opened. A European Parliament briefing (EPRS_BRI(2024)762868) reads the “take note” wording the same way; seen as a snippet only. The high-level meeting of the General Assembly on future generations during the 83rd session, expected in 2028, is recorded in the same research base from the pact’s follow-up provisions. No report of an appointed Special Envoy was found as of 24 September 2026. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  24. The earlier version of this note, a stub with a tl;dr and a reading list, described longtermism as “a religious cult for the (tech) wealthy, backed by the likes of Thiel and Musk to provide a moral philosophy for their appalling behavior.” The sentence is quoted from the vault’s record of that version; the present note replaces it. ↩

  25. Musk, E., reply on Twitter, 2 August 2022, https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1554335028313718784. The wording was verified through Perplexity; the tweet itself was not opened, since X does not serve its pages to fetch tools. Foreign Policy of 12 November 2022 called it an endorsement. ↩

  26. Thiel Foundation figures and the MIRI timeline: $100,000 in matching funds for the 2006 “Singularity Challenge,” $1,627,000 cumulative, board membership from around 2007 to 2014. Cited here through a Perplexity summary of the foundation’s own figures and a timeline document, since the primary texts were not checked; URLs not recorded. Searches of public documentation for Thiel funding of GPI, FHI, CSER or Forethought returned nothing. Thiel’s early MIRI money and his keynote at the 2013 EA Summit are in Effective Altruism. ↩

  27. Thorstad, D. (2024). “Mistakes in the Moral Mathematics of Existential Risk.” Ethics 135(1), pages 122 to 150; GPI Working Paper No. 7-2023, https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/David-Thorstad-Three-mistakes-in-the-moral-mathematics-of-existential-risk.pdf. Opened for this note. Thorstad’s conclusion is gradual: the estimates are inflated and the case is threatened; he does not declare the thesis refuted. ↩

  28. Tarsney, C. “The Epistemic Challenge to Longtermism.” GPI Working Paper, several versions 2019 to 2022, https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Tarsney-Epistemic-Challenge-to-Longtermism.pdf. Quotation extracted from the PDF for this note. Tarsney’s own verdict is that the challenge “is serious” and “not fatal to the longtermist thesis.” He traces the figure to Bostrom’s own “Pascal’s Mugging” (Analysis 69(3), 2009). ↩

  29. Setiya, K. (2022). “The New Moral Mathematics.” Boston Review, 15 August 2022, https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/the-new-moral-mathematics/. Opened for this note. Setiya’s one-sentence verdict is that “a moral arithmetic is only as good as its axioms,” and he records that MacAskill himself credits the three-outcome comparison to Parfit. ↩

  30. Singer, P. (2021). “The Hinge of History.” Project Syndicate, 8 October 2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ethical-implications-of-focusing-on-extinction-risk-by-peter-singer-2021-10. Opened for this note. The sentence quoted opens with “The dangers of treating extinction risk as humanity’s overriding concern should be obvious.” ↩

  31. Chappell, R. Y. (2026). “The Train to Crazy Town.” Good Thoughts, 29 June 2026, https://goodthoughts.blog/p/the-train-to-crazy-town. Opened for this note; “swamping” and the guardrails sentence stand there. His review of What We Owe the Future (15 August 2022, https://goodthoughts.blog/p/review-of-what-we-owe-the-future) reads the book as a call for “moral circle expansion.” ↩

  32. Zaitchik, A. (2022). “The Heavy Price of Longtermism.” The New Republic, 24 October 2022, https://newrepublic.com/article/168047/longtermism-future-humanity-william-macaskill. Opened for this note. ↩

  33. Gebru, T., tweet of 30 April 2022, https://twitter.com/timnitGebru/status/1520532465474883584. Wording confirmed through a Wayback Machine snapshot of 11 November 2025; the tweet continues that the movement “has convinced itself that the best thing to do for ‘all of humanity’ is to throw as much money as possible to the problem of ‘AGI’.” The full text is in the reading list below. Kaspersen and Wallach as in note 16. ↩

  34. Torres, É. P. (2021). “Why longtermism is the world’s most dangerous secular credo.” Aeon, 19 October 2021, https://aeon.co/essays/why-longtermism-is-the-worlds-most-dangerous-secular-credo. Opened for this note. Torres published the 2021 pieces under the name Phil Torres and has since changed their name; this note uses the current name throughout. ↩

  35. Gebru, T. and Torres, É. P. (2024). “The TESCREAL bundle: Eugenics and the promise of utopia through artificial general intelligence.” First Monday 29(4), 14 April 2024, https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/13636. The abstract page was opened for this note, and the quotation is from the abstract. ↩

  36. Anthony, A. (2024). The Guardian, 28 April 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/apr/28/nick-bostrom-controversial-future-of-humanity-institute-closure-longtermism-affective-altruism. Opened for this note. The article reports the 1996 email and quotes Torres: “Torres has come to believe that the work of the FHI and its offshoots amounts to what they call a ‘noxious ideology’ and ‘eugenics on steroids’.” The email surfaced in January 2023 after Torres found it in a mailing-list archive; Bostrom published it himself with an apology, and Oxford’s inquiry, concluded in August 2023, found the apology sincere (the inquiry details are cited here through a Perplexity summary, since the primary text was not checked). The email’s wording is not reproduced in this note. ↩

  37. Emba, C. (2022). “Why ‘longtermism’ isn’t ethically sound.” The Washington Post, 5 September 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/05/longtermism-philanthropy-altruism-risks/. Read through a Wayback Machine snapshot of 6 September 2024 because of the paywall; the wording matches the freely visible opening of the live page. Emba gives the Open Philanthropy figure of more than $480 million since 2015 and an FTX Future Fund figure of about $132 million. ↩

  38. Huet (2023), as in note 14. The sentence is Huet’s own compression of the position; it quotes no longtermist author. ↩

  39. Karpf, D. (2022). “Against Jackpot-Longtermism.” Substack, 13 August 2022, https://davekarpf.substack.com/p/against-jackpot-longtermism. Opened for this note. Karpf’s summary of Gibson’s Jackpot is a slow, multi-causal loss of 80 percent of the world’s population. ↩

  40. Ord, T. (2021). Written evidence to a UK parliamentary committee, 27 January 2021, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/21833/html/, Annex B, reproducing the table from The Precipice word for word. Opened for this note. The full table: asteroid or comet impact 1 in 1,000,000; supervolcanic eruption 1 in 10,000; stellar explosion 1 in 1,000,000,000; nuclear war 1 in 1,000; climate change 1 in 1,000; other environmental damage 1 in 1,000; naturally arising pandemics 1 in 10,000; engineered pandemics 1 in 30; unaligned artificial intelligence 1 in 10; unforeseen anthropogenic risks 1 in 30; other anthropogenic risks 1 in 50; total 1 in 6. Ord in the same submission puts “the probability of such an event in the next century at one in six.” ↩

  41. Ord, T. (2024). “The Precipice Revisited.” tobyord.com, 12 July 2024, https://www.tobyord.com/writing/the-precipice-revisited. Opened for this note. ↩

  42. 80,000 Hours, “Climate change” problem profile, https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/climate-change/, and its 2021 version through the Wayback Machine, http://web.archive.org/web/20211006053932/https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/climate-change/; the ranking from https://80000hours.org/career-guide/world-problems/. All three opened for this note. The October 2024 announcement, “Updates to our problem rankings of factory farming, climate change, and more,” 8 October 2024, https://80000hours.org/2024/10/updates-to-our-problem-rankings-on-factory-farming-climate-change-and-more/, was opened for this note; both quoted sentences stand there. ↩

  43. MacAskill in an interview with Persuasion, 2025, https://www.persuasion.community/p/william-macaskill. Opened for this note. In the same interview he expects “two degrees of warming, perhaps three degrees.” ↩ ↩2

  44. Open Philanthropy, “Our progress in 2023 and plans for 2024,” now at https://coefficientgiving.org/research/our-progress-in-2023-and-plans-for-2024/, for the portfolio rename and its stated reason; cited here through a Perplexity summary, since the post’s text was not checked. Coefficient Giving, “The story behind our new name,” https://coefficientgiving.org, opened for this note: announcement of 18 November 2025, five stated reasons (a shift from staff work for Good Ventures to multi-donor advice, confusion with Good Ventures, confusion with OpenAI and the Open Society Foundations, the implied “radical transparency,” and poor legibility for new audiences), same legal entity. ↩ ↩2

  45. FHI: The Guardian, 19 April 2024, as in note 12: closure on 16 April 2024, Oxford’s stated reason a periodic review of research structures, Bostrom’s phrase “death by bureaucracy,” the freeze from 2020 and the contracts unrenewed at the end of 2023. GPI: https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org, opened for this note, closure at the end of July 2025, research to continue through “a community of interested researchers,” no reason given. ↩

  46. UK: announced by Technology Secretary Peter Kyle at the Munich Security Conference on 14 February 2025, with gov.uk’s stated reasons; cited here through a Perplexity summary that draws on the gov.uk announcement, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tackling-ai-security-risks-to-unleash-growth-and-deliver-plan-for-change, and TechCrunch, since the texts were not checked. US: Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, 6 June 2025, Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) at NIST, https://www.nist.gov/caisi; cited here through a secondary summary, since the text was not checked. The institute’s origin is in note 21. ↩

  47. MacAskill’s use of the term in 80,000 Hours interviews of 11 March and 13 October 2025 (the first at https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/will-macaskill-century-in-a-decade-navigating-intelligence-explosion/), and Ord’s in “Shaping Humanity’s Longterm Trajectory,” a 2025 chapter in Essays on Longtermism (Oxford University Press), are cited here through a Perplexity summary, since the texts were not checked. ↩

  48. The Welsh Well-being of Future Generations Act, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/anaw/2015/2/contents, received Royal Assent on 29 April 2015; the current commissioner is Derek Walker, since March 2023 (gov.wales, cited through a Perplexity summary). The UN proposal of 2013 is the one Guterres refers to in paragraph 58 of “Our Common Agenda” (note 15); it was not looked up separately. Searches for a stated position on longtermism by the Association of Professional Futurists and the World Futures Studies Federation returned nothing; that is a negative result from searching, with the limits of the method. The School of International Futures publishes an “Implementation Handbook for the UN Declaration on Future Generations” and runs a “Long-Term Governance Programme” (soif.org.uk, cited here through a Perplexity summary, since the site was not opened). The Long Now Foundation: https://longnow.org; Krznaric’s book page: https://www.romankrznaric.com/good-ancestor. Salk’s question, the Long Now of Brand and Eno, cathedral thinking and the Seventh Generation Principle are the references of the humanistic tradition as gathered in Krznaric’s The Good Ancestor and in this vault’s reading notes on it. ↩ ↩2

  49. Krznaric, R. in EU Scream, episode 110, “Philosophy and Future Generations,” 4 September 2024. Episode page with timestamped quotations, https://pod.wave.co/podcast/eu-scream/ep110-philosophy-and-future-generations, timestamps 53:22 and 55:07. The page, which marks its summaries as AI-generated, was opened for this note; both sentences stand there, and the audio was not checked against them. An earlier stage of the research recorded a further sentence from the episode, “I’m a strong opponent of the idea of longtermism,” which the page does not contain; it is not used here. ↩

  50. Krznaric, R. (2019). “Have We Colonised The Future?” romankrznaric.com, 20 March 2019, https://www.romankrznaric.com/outrospection/2019/03/20/7277, quoting his own BBC Future article “Why We Need To Reinvent Democracy for the Long-Term.” Opened for this note. He repeats the sentence almost word for word in a Five Books interview of July 2020, https://fivebooks.com/best-books/long-term-thinking-roman-krznaric/. “Colonised” is Krznaric’s spelling. ↩

Linked References

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